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THE FUNCTIONALISM OF LEGAL ORIGINS

1.

Introduction

Nothing could better characterize the state of legal studies in general, and comparative law in particular, than the fact that the topic for this jubilee issue of Ius Commune Europaeum is neither European nor actually legal. The legal origins literature
has been generated by US-based self-declared ‘lawyers wannabe’1 and discussion
among economists continues to pay fairly little attention to the views of legal scholars. The World Bank, which established its ‘Doing Business’ group to implement
and expand on much of this research, employed, for a long time, only economists
and no lawyers in the respective research groups.2 Lawyers have been on the
receiving end of this literature. Holmes’ prediction, made in 1897, seems finally to
have come true: ‘For the rational study of the law the blackletter man may be the
man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master
of economics.’3 Similarly, Mattei’s finding from two decades ago seems true as well:
the wind has changed; it is now coming from the United States.4
If the use of economics US style still feels relatively new, the outcomes do not.
Neither that law matters nor that the common law is superior to the civil law, are
new ideas. Nor is the method used satisfactory. From a comparative law
perspective, the focus on formal law (law in the books) is too narrow, the use of the
civil law/common law distinction is inexcusably simplistic, the understanding of
legal transplants is simplistic, and the assumed commensurability between legal
systems at least problematic.5 From a social science perspective, the new literature
appears to run into many of the problems that brought the older law and
development movement down.
In this paper, I want to focus on a trope that connects comparative law and
social science, namely the use of functional methods,6 and see what the trope has to
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say about the legal origins literature. Of course, the legal origins literature is not
explicitly functionalist, so both analysis and application of critique require a
translation. Yet that translation helps link the legal origins literature to broader
debates in the social sciences – and at the same helps explain why it is so successful.
Ultimately, I reach three results. In section 2, I demonstrate that the legal
origins literature represents a functionalist method, and that perceived internal
inconsistencies and tensions in the legal origins literature match similar
inconsistencies between different concepts of functionalism. Although economics
does not usually resort to the language of functionalism, ultimately it is a functionalist discipline. In section 3, I show that anti-functionalist critique in the social
sciences is similarly powerful against the legal origins literature. In section 4, I
suggest that the legal origins literature is more successful than predecessors in the
field of law and development not because it has a better theoretical foundation but
instead, ironically, because it has less. In short, the objectivity suggested by statistics
and rankings blinds for underlying theoretical shortcomings. In a concluding
section, finally, I speculate about the limits of such endeavours.

2.

Legal Origins as Functionalism

How can we say that the legal origins literature represents a functionalist method?
Although it has been remarked before that the legal origins literature has a close
affinity with functionalist comparative law or sociological functionalism,7 this affinity is not explicit. Where La Porta et al cite to Zweigert and Kötz, they cite not to the
famous elaboration of the functional method, but mostly to the classification of legal
families.8
Moreover, the legal origins literature is not uniform, and displays internal
contradictions. One such contradiction is this: whereas some articles suggest that
‘one size fits all’, that best practices and legal rules can be identified and then
recommended to all legal systems alike, others suggest, instead, that the best fit is a
function of local circumstances and conditions.9 Another contradiction is this: the legal origins literature claims that, on the one hand, legal origins (i.e. events centuries
ago) are still determinative for success today, and, on the other hand, that legal
reform can bring about change.10
These contradictions are not surprising from the perspective of functionalism.
Similar contradictions are known there, arising from unclear and competing concepts of functionalism.11 Between disciplines, the focus differs – more systemic and
static in sociology, more teleological and dynamic in political sciences, more instrumentalist in policy studies. Even within one discipline, definitions differ. Thus,
when Kingsley Davis famously declared, in 1959, that functional analysis was syn7
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onymous with sociology, his point was not to posit a uniform method and theory,
but the opposite: There was no one functional method; instead, all sociological
methods properly speaking were functionalist, so, important methodological debates were concealed under the label of functionalism.12 It should be noted that the
functional method in comparative law also presents a mix of these concepts.13
Here, I want to confine myself to three different concepts.

2.1.

System Functionalism

A first concept of functionalism is a descriptive one.14 It is assumed that societies
face certain problems, and institutions (in the broadest sense) emerge that respond
to these problems. The response to the problem is the function that the institution
plays for the society at large. Epistemologically, this means that the institution must
be understood with regard to the function it plays. Moreover, the function explains
both the existence and the persistence of an institution. At the same time, this implies that society must be understood as a system that is capable of generating
problems. And solutions are system-specific – even if problems are universal (a
controversial assumption), each society is likely to find the solution best equipped
for its own situation. I call this idea system-functionalism.
We can see this concept at work in Glaeser and Shleifer’s article on legal
origins.15 The authors ask why different legal systems emerged in England and
France in the 12th century and offer a purely functional analysis. They identify a
common problem (they say ‘goal’) all legal systems face, namely ‘to protect law
enforcers from being bullied with either physical force or bribes by powerful local
interests’. The legal regimes are functional responses to this common problem, and
they differ according to the respective society:16 in France, feudal lords feared each
other more than a despot, so they delegated lawmaking power to the king. In
England, by contrast, feudal landlords were not afraid of each other, so they
preferred paying the king so they could adjudicate independently. This is, then, a
theory of functional equivalents: both centralized law in France and jury-based law
in England fulfil the same function and are in this sense equivalent, not similar.

2.2.

Finalism

A second concept of functionalism follows from the first but is at least partly different and can be called finalism. System-functionalism could be understood as a static
theory, where societies are at equilibrium because their problems all find solutions.
According to the finalism, however, solutions to problems create new problems that
require new solutions. As a consequence, functionalism turns into a dynamic theory
that explains and, ideally, predicts, the development of society. The best-known
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example for such a predictive theory is European integration: once one legal area is
harmonized, this creates new pressures toward the harmonization of other areas,
with the result that integration becomes ever closer.17 Often, however, finalism is
used in retrospect, to explain developments in the past as somehow necessary.
This strand is clearly present in the legal origins literature, which explains the
development of legal systems as determined by their past. Thus, Glaeser et al. argue
that codification in 19th century French ‘naturally follows from the original choice of
royal judges over juries’: to control these judges further, the sovereign must create
clear rules (which they believe to be characteristic of the French Code) that make
deviation easily observable. In other words, a problem – independence of courts
from local pressure – created a solution – royal judges – which in turn created a new
problem – central control of judges – and a new functional response – codification.

2.3.

Instrumentalism

The third concept of functionalism is different still. Here, the emphasis shifts from
an epistemological and descriptive to a normative position. Now, institutions are
viewed as tools, introduced by decision makers in order to resolve certain problems
or achieve certain goals. ‘Law is social engineering’, claim Zweigert and Kötz.
following Roscoe Pound.18 The lawyer constructs legal rules in response to societal
requirements. I call this third idea instrumentalism.
Instrumentalism is not obvious in most of the economic literature on legal
origins, which is, at least on its face, mostly positive not normative. Instrumentalism
is, however, clearly present in the World Bank’s Doing Business Reports, which are
themselves influenced by the legal origins literature. These reports advise underdeveloped countries to adopt legal solutions that have been successful elsewhere.
Law reform is viewed in the perspective of social engineering, with a particular
comparative and functionalist-instrumentalist bent: what worked elsewhere in a
donor country should also work and bring about progress in the receiving country.
Remarkably, at least in its early reports, the World Bank suggested ‘that when it
comes to the manner of regulation, one size often fits all (in many cases there really
is one best practice)’.19 In other words, not only are problems universal; best solutions are also universal, regardless of their origin or their social and legal context.

2.4.

Interrelations

It is obviously easy to confuse these ideas. For all of them, institutions relate to, are
answers to, problems. In some ways, instrumentalism may look like the normative
equivalent of system functionalism. And yet, the difference is relevant. Systemfunctionalism starts from problems faced by the system of society as such; the
ultimate function analyzed is, typically, the stabilization of society. Teleological
functionalism shares the interest in society as such, but instead of stabilization,
focus is on some kind of development. Instrumentalism, by contrast, focuses on
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smaller, seemingly isolated problems – the reduction of crime, access to the justice
system, getting creditors to pay their debts, etc. Such purposes may be related to the
general function of society stabilization, but this relation is not a necessary one: we
may intend to strengthen the due process rights of men accused for murder even if
this is detrimental to societal stability.
System-functionalism and teleological functionalism account not only for
manifest functions – those that are known and intended – but also, perhaps particularly, for latent functions – those that institutions perform, although they were not
made for those functions and although those functions may not even be recognized
within the society.20 Instrumentalism, by contrast, accounts only for the actual
purpose of an institution.21
System-functionalism is a theory aimed at understanding what stabilizes
societies, without necessarily taking a position on whether such stabilization is
desirable, or whether the institutions at stake are actually desirable. Teleological
functionalism could likewise be viewed as purely descriptive in this sense, though
the open acknowledgment of an intrinsic telos suggests a normative bent. Instrumentalism, by contrast, must necessarily take the desirability of the intended
purpose into account.

3.

Anti-Functionalist Criticisms

This reconceptualization of legal origins as functionalism is helpful for an
assessment of the limits and promises of legal origins because it helps us tap into
the rich array of methodological and theoretical debates devoted to functionalism in
other disciplines –anthropology, sociology, to some extent also comparative law.
Like the concepts of functionalism, critique is somewhat undifferentiated: some
criticism is inspired against one kind of functionalism yet voiced against another.

3.1.

Society as the Object of Functions

One challenge against functionalism concerns the idea of society. Legal rules can be
responses to societal problems only if societies at large exist and have common
problems. Yet different parts of societies may have different, often conflicting,
needs, and legal rules may well satisfy some, while running against other needs. At
the same time, the instrumentalist idea that problems can be isolated from their
broader societal context seems problematic: for example, whether traffic accidents
are compensated through tort law or through mandatory insurance has implications
on the insurance market, the size of the regulatory apparatus of the state, etc.
To some extent, the legal origins literature takes this into account. Studies of
corruption, for example, explain certain rules as performing functions for certain
members of society, while being dysfunctional for society at large. However, in the
20
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end, the yardstick remains society. This reflects the interest in aggregate welfare
over distributive questions that characterizes much of Chicago-style economics
more generally. In the legal origins literature, however, the problem is enhanced,
because the interest in ‘doing business’ (obviously a particular interest) is treated as
though it were congruent with the interests of society at large. The Doing Business
reports have been chided for insufficient attention to labour rights (which may be in
tension with investors’ interests), but by and large, the focus on entire economies
remains.

3.2.

Necessitarianism

A second frequent criticism of functionalism has been directed against the legal
origins literature as well: the assumption that legal institutions necessarily perform
certain functions and that certain functions make certain laws necessary.22 The function of courts is to enforce contracts; the enforcement of contracts requires effective
courts. This means, first that other functions of legal rules are ignored: warning
functions of formal requirements, social protection in tenancy and employment
laws, etc. Cioffi has recently voiced a similar criticism against the legal origins literature.23 It means, secondly, that functional equivalents are insufficiently accounted
for, a point Mathias Siems has made forcefully with regard to the legal origins
literature.24 It means, thirdly, that functionalism does not easily account for dysfunctional rules or for so-called survivals – rules that may at some point have had a
function but no longer do.25 As a consequence, functionalism tends to become
apologetic for the status quo. In legal origins, this is strangely half-true: the literature is not at all apologetic of the status quo in underdeveloped countries, but it
does accept, at face value it seems, the functionality of most law in the United
States.
A related problem is the perceived conservative bias of functionalism. System
functionalism prioritizes societal cohesion over conflict, so the criticism goes, just as
legal origins prioritizes aggregate economic progress over other societal concerns.
Teleological functionalism accounts insufficiently for human agency and creativity
by suggesting that things could not have developed otherwise than they have, just
as legal origins depicts ostensibly necessary trajectories from a system’s legal
origins.
This criticism of necessitarianism does not apply to instrumentalism, which
explicitly favours human agency, but here the criticism is the opposite: the
technocratic approach to law as a tool towards the fixing of problems
underestimates not only the systemic resistances to such but also the underlying
political and social tensions that characterize society.
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3.3.

Reductionism

A third critique goes against the perceived reductionism of functionalism, which
reduces legal rules to their functions.26 Even if reductionism is not necessary for
functionalist comparative law,27 it seems unavoidable for legal origins. Coding as
the method of the legal origins literature is necessarily reductionist; its isolation of
single elements represents the polar opposite of thick description. Cioffi has rightly
pointed out that LLSV ‘seeks to reconcile the macro- and micro-level dimensions of
law through microeconomic theory and functionalist analysis’.28 Such combination
of micro- and macro-comparison is necessary for proper functionalist comparative
law, too.29 Nonetheless, this means that other considerations, like justice or culture,
have no place in the analysis. In one version, culture is absent altogether. In another,
culture appears merely as an inadequate representation of what are really functional responses to problems (for example, ritualistic dance is ‘really’ about social cohesion). In yet another version, culture’s irrationality stands in the way of functionalist
rationality, as an obstacle to progress. Such criticism has been voiced against the
legal origins literature in particular from French critics.30
Reductionism may be justifiable, to some extent, to ensure commensurability
as a key prerequisite for comparability and therefore a key issue in comparative
law. Comparison requires a tertium comparationis: we always compare legal systems
with regard to a specific factor, be it the performance of a certain function or something else. It follows that findings of similarity and difference are always relative to
the specific tertium that was chosen. Absolute comparison is impossible. This is even
more true for determining the better law: a law can be better than another only with
regard to the specific function they both perform. The legal origins literature accepts
this restriction, as do the Doing Business reports. However, in the presentation, the
relative character of the comparison drops out of sight. This may be the biggest
problem with the ranking of countries in the Doing Business reports: they suggest a
ranking with regard to the absolute quality of legal systems, and they thereby put
pressure on countries to focus their domestic policies on the factors that the Doing
Business report measures – and to neglect other functions of the law. It appears as
though the common law is better than the civil law tout court, instead of only in
promoting economic growth as measured in the project.

3.4.

The Better Law Fallacy

A fourth critique of functionalism, especially in form of instrumentalism, goes
against what is called the ‘better law approach’. Zweigert and Kötz argued that a
functional comparison can ‘suggest[ing] how a specific problem can most appropri-
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ately be solved under the given social and economic circumstances’.31 Functionalism
is thus expected to do two ostentatiously incompatible things – to show which legal
rules are of equal value (‘equivalent’) in their responding to a given problem, and at
the same time to show which of them is of the highest value, constitutes the best
solution. The legal origins literature does the same: it explains legal rules as determined by their origin, while at the same time proclaiming which of them is the best
one. On the micro-level, these tend to be the more deregulated solutions. On the
macro-level, the general result is that the common law, by and large, performs
better than do civil law systems (though among the latter, systems based on
German law are said to perform slightly better than those based on French law).32
This implies the suggestion that the better law can be identified regardless of
context (one size fits all)33 (though they have recently somewhat moderated this
claim). This idea runs against a problem known from functionalist comparative law:
the quality of a law depends on its context; transplanted laws may perform differently in different legal systems.34 Strangely, the legal origins literature occasionally
concedes this point: legal institutions may function well in developed countries but
not in developing countries.
Whytock has recently suggested a way out of this problem: we should not
evaluate legal institutions against some assumed objective standard, but rather
assess their actual consequences vis-à-vis their purpose (Whytock speaks of ‘intended function’).35 This is a valuable suggestion for instrumentalism but not, it seems,
for system functionalism that focuses in particular on latent functions. This step also
takes away one presumed advantage of functionalist comparative law, namely to
identify a factor (function) that is similar in different legal systems. Purposes, by
contrast, differ as among legal systems.

4.

The Strange Lure of Economics

None of these critiques is particularly new. For sociology, Merton formulated, and
answered, most of them as early as 1949.36 In comparative law, all of these (and
more) have long been voiced as well.37 Nor is it surprising that they should be
applicable to the legal origins literature. What is surprising is that the legal origins
literature has, so far, survived these critiques that were damning elsewhere.

4.1.

Legal Origins as Law and Development – a Déjà vu

The main focus of the legal origins literature is not on developed economies (though
the ferocious defences of French law coming from French comparative lawyers
31
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could suggest that).38 For the descriptive and analytical project the law of developed
countries – especially England and France – is used, predominantly, as an exogenous factor to understand the relationship between law and development in former
colonies. For the normative project, the main hope is to improve the economies of
underdeveloped countries. This is clear especially in the Doing Business project of
the World Bank, which focuses predominantly on underdeveloped countries, in
accordance with the Bank’s mission ‘to help developing countries and their people
reach the goals by working with our partners to alleviate poverty’.39
Thus, although the authors do not explicitly acknowledge it, both their focus
and findings place this literature in the law and development movement.40 That
movement, at least in its US version, pursued many of the same goals as the legal
origins literature, albeit mostly with a somewhat different normative bent.41 Here as
well, the hope was to bring about economic success through legal reform. The
project was, then, to identify those legal institutions that are conducive to economic
success, implement them in developing countries, and then see the economy prosper. Law, understood mostly as formal rules and institutions, was viewed not as a
cultural and culture-defined product, but instead as an instrument that could be
applied towards development. Because western societies were the most advanced,
their legal systems provided the toolbox from which these instruments were chosen.
That first law and development movement, however, withered away, for
reasons that were empirical, financial, and theoretical.42 Empirically, the hopes did
not materialize: law reform, widely, did not spur success. The scholars promoting it
found themselves in what Trubek and Galanter have called self-estrangement, the
realization that they had contributed to something quite different from what they
had intended.43 Financially, support was withdrawn from development projects,
partly for lack of success, party for ideological reasons.44 Theoretically, the proclaimed direct link between law and societal well-being was found to be too simplistic.
Importantly, much of the theoretical criticism was directed against the simple
functionalism underlying law and development. Indeed, we can understand the
first law and development movement as a functionalist project. The Ford foundation justified its $ 3 Mio. grant for an International Legal Centre with the clearly
functionalist goal ‘to help developing countries establish legal institutions essential
to the functioning of modern, free societies’.45 This reflected a widespread understanding at the time of law, in particular Western-type law, as performing necessary
functions towards the well-being of society. The hope was that the introduction of
Western-style laws and institutions could bring about the same prosperity in
underdeveloped countries as existed in the West. The underlying idea that societies
must go through various stages of development46 reflects the teleological worldview
38
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that characterizes some social science functionalism. At the same time, law was here
understood instrumentally, as a tool to be utilized to bring such success about.
Consequently, much of the criticism made against the first law and development
movement mirrors, or is borrowed from, critique made against functionalism.

4.2.

The Resilience of Legal Origins

Why then does the new literature not simply fail to the same type of criticism? One
possible explanation would be that the new functionalism is different from the old
one. Kerry Rittich has pointed out some differences:47 the narrow focus on economic
success instead of overall societal well-being,48 the widespread reliance on neoclassical models and statistical research rather than close case studies, the preference
for formal rules and institutions (law in the books) over entrenched law (law in
action). None of these differences, however, can explain why the new literature can
successfully escape the critique that brought the old law and development down.
Scholars have pointed out that the new law and development literature suffers from
many of the same shortcomings as the old one.
A second explanation is ideological. Where old law and development was
predominantly a cause for the political left, the new literature is decidedly market
liberal. Perhaps, the first law and development movement failed largely not for
theoretical and methodological but for political reasons: it was unable to survive the
political shift in the 1970s against the political left. However, such an explanation is
insufficient, too. Although the new law and development project relies a lot on
markets, it is not confined to the political right: there is broad political support for
reform projects.
Both may be good reasons, but I think the most important one is a third one:
the decline of sociology and the rise of economics, and with that a change in
academic sensitivities. It seems safe to say that economics as a discipline is less
occupied with matters of theory than is sociology. Or, put differently, theoretical
critique of the assumptions, explicit or not, on which economic modelling rests, has
done less against the self-confidence in the mainstream than it did, decades ago, in
sociology and anthropology. The ability of economics to show results in objectivelooking numbers and rankings has somehow rendered secondary the question
whether these numbers and rankings rest on theoretically tenable assumptions. The
reductionist quality of rankings is an advantage for their marketability. Rankings
are simpler than complex comparisons and look more objective. Only very recently
have scholars begun to question the use of indicators, central to both the legal
origins literature and the Doing Business Reports, as an undertheorized mode of
governance.49 In particular, anti-functionalist critique has never been damning to
economics because functionalism was never explicitly adopted as a method in the
first place. Geoffrey Ingham has pointed out that economics as a discipline has so
far largely ignored the criticism launched against functionalism within sociology
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and anthropology, where the theory is practically dead today.50 This is so although,
at its core, the economic method used by the legal origins literature and the Doing
Business reports is really a quantitative refinement of the functional method.51
This anti-theoretical stance exists not only in economics. If anything, it is even
stronger in applied comparative law. Take, for example, the brief section on theory
in the otherwise excellent ‘Anatomy of Corporate Law’ by Kraakman et al. They
begin by acknowledging that a functionalist project is not unproblemtatic:
‘We realize that the term “functional”, which we have used here and in our title, means
different things to different people, and that some of the uses to which that term has
been put in the past – particularly in the field of sociology – have made the term
justifiably suspect.’ 52

One would, then, expect two things to follow: first, a precision of what is meant by
functional here, and second, at least a brief statement as to why the suspicion is
unfounded for this book. The authors, however, treat all of this as a mere problem
of labelling:
‘It would perhaps be more accurate to call our approach “economic” rather than
“functional”, though the sometimes tendentious use of economic argumentation in
legal literature has also caused many scholars, particularly outside of the United States,
to be as wary of “economic analysis” as they are of “functional analysis”.’

Justifiable suspicion for the term ‘functional,’ regionally confined wariness for the
term ‘economic’ – what is the answer? Surprisingly, it is this: we can engage in
functional analysis, as long as we close our eyes to its theoretical problems.
‘For the purposes at hand, however, we need not commit ourselves on fine points of
social science methodology. We need simply note that the exigencies of commercial
activity and organization present practical problems that have a rough similarity in
developed market economies throughout the world, that corporate law everywhere
must necessarily address these problems, and that the forces of logic, competition,
interest group pressure, imitation, and compatibility tend to lead different jurisdictions
to choose roughly similar solutions to these problems.’

How can it be unnecessary to address ‘fine’ points of social science methodology, if
what is ‘noted’ are all the problematic elements of that methodology – similarity of
problems across countries, necessary types of solutions, a teleological confined
trajectory of globalization? We are reminded of the anti-theoretical tradition in
comparative law, most famously expressed in the statement that disciplines that
must deal with their own methods are dead disciplines.53 Viewed like this, the
livelihood of the new law and development literature comes at the expense of
theoretical foundations. Ironically, that seems to be to its advantage.
50
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5.

Conclusion

What should we follow from this juxtaposition of functionalism and legal origins?
My conclusion is ambivalent.
The success may suggest that the critique of functionalism in sociology was
overblown. Maybe, a more sophisticated functionalism is actually a promising
method and theory at the same time.54 Such a functionalism would have to take into
account at least three insights from the functionalism debate. The first is Merton’s
suggestion that many of the assumptions of functionalism ought to be treated as no
more than testable hypotheses.55 The second is the emphasis on the possibility of
functional equivalents, long a topic in discussions of functionalism, but put at the
centre of the theory only, as far as I can see, in Niklas Luhmann’s early discussions
of functionalism.56 The third is the need for a systemic perspective, in which
individual legal rules interact with the entire legal system.57
Progress is made on all three points. The need for more empirics may be the
broadest theme: much of the criticism of legal origins questions the assumptions
and ask for testing. The second, the focus on functional equivalents, requires special
comparative law expertise that non-lawyers often lack, but it seems to me that for
example the Oxford project around John Armour makes very promising advances
in this regards, especially on the level of macro-comparison. Similarly, Gillian
Hadfield’s macro-comparison, which emphasizes context-specificity and functional
equivalence more, seems promising.58 The third point, finally, the sense for a
systemic approach, underlies much of Katharina Pistor’s recent work.59
Pistor’s critique of the legal origins literature is also instructive, however, for
what might remain a necessary limit of its method: Statistical analysis is necessarily
reductionist. Such reductionism may sometimes be helpful;60 but its use seems
limited: by necessity, greater breadth reduces depth. This seems especially problematic in comparative law, where the number of legal systems in the world is too
small, the differences between them to great, to yield truly meaningful statistical
results, except in a fairly limited number of issues.
Some scholars have suggested, therefore, to move away from quantitative to
qualitative analysis, and to focus in particular on case studies. This move resembles
the suggested move in comparative law from functionalist to culturalist comparative law, and thereby from explicit comparison to a more hermeneutic approach. In
comparative law, such a move comes with a cost, and the same is undoubtedly true
in law and development. The challenge for comparative law will be to integrate
functionalist and culturalist comparison.61 In law and development, this might be
54

55
56
57

58
59
60
61
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I make this point in Michaels 2006a. For a defence of functionalism in economics, see Jackson
2002.
Merton 1968.
For discussion, see Michaels 2006a, p. 356-359.
I make this point generally in Michaels 2006b, and more specifically with regard to legal
origins, in Michaels 2009b.
Hadfield 2008.
Pistor 2009.
Thus e.g. Hadfield 2009; Spamann 2009.
My own first suggestion is to use the idea of legal paradigms: Michaels 2006b.
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done through a combination of statistical analysis and case studies, as suggested by
Milhaupt and Pistor.62 Such an approach could save the best of functionalist and
culturalist approaches, but it would look very different from the legal origins
literature as it exists today.
.

62

Milhaupt & Pistor 2008.
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